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The Two Schools of Thought and
Informed Consent Doctrines in
Pennsylvania: A Model for Integration
I.

Introduction

The two schools of thought doctrine provides an absolute defense
to medical malpractice liability when a physician has chosen one
medically acceptable course of action over alternative treatments that
enjoy the support of other medical experts.' The doctrine is founded
on the principle that juries, with their limited medical knowledge,
should not be forced to decide which of two acceptable treatments
should have been performed by a defendant physician. 2 Historically,
the lower courts in Pennsylvania have held that a second school of
medical thought3 exists when "reputable and respected" medical
authorities support a particular mode of treatment.4 However, in Jones
v. Chidester,5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently restricted the
use of this defense to cases in which the disputed treatment is supported
by a "considerable number" of recognized and respected physicians. 6
The Chidester decision appears to have some serious ramifications
for health care in Pennsylvania. For example, the decision may inhibit
the use of medically innovative procedures in Pennsylvania. By
requiring physicians to treat patients in accordance with the practices of
a considerable number of their colleagues, Chidester may cause
physicians to hesitate to use innovative medical treatments that are
currently employed by relatively few physicians. Consequently, some
patients may be denied beneficial treatments simply because a physician
fears liability under the "considerable number" standard.

1. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 965 (Pa. 1992).
2. See Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa. Super. 117, 121 (1922). The two schools of thought
doctrine applies only in instances where there is a dispute over the treatment of the plaintiff's
illness; it does not apply in cases involving a dispute over the accuracy of a physician's diagnosis.
Levine v. Rosen, 575 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
3. The law distinguishes between a school of medicine and a school of thought. A school
of medicine relates to a medical practitioner's training in a particular system of diagnosis and
treatment Bekkemo v. Erickson, 242 N.W. 617, 619 (Minn. 1932). The practitioner is held to
the standard of care of the school of medicine in which he or she was trained. W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32 at 187 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
KEETON]. For example, a podiatrist is held only to the standard of care of podiatrists and not to
that of medical doctors. Botehlo v. Bycura, 320 S.E.2d 59, 64 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
4. E.g., Levine v. Rosen, 575 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Trent v. Trotman, 508 A.2d
580 (Pa. Super. Ct 1986); Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 472 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984).
5. 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992).
6. Id. at 969.
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In addition to potentially inhibiting medical innovation, Chidester
effectively encourages physicians to withhold important information
from patients regarding the risks and alternatives to treatment.
Currently, Pennsylvania's informed consent doctrine does not require
patients to be informed of the risks and alternatives to noninvasive
procedures such as drug therapy and radiation treatment.7
Consequently, in their efforts to prescribe treatments that meet
Chidester's quantitative standard, physicians may not want to inform
patients of alternatives that do not enjoy "considerable" support because
patients may choose an alternative that could lead to liability under
Chidester. Without knowledge of risks and alternative treatments,
patients have no choice but to accept therapies approved by a
"considerable number" of physicians.
Chidester thereby deprives
patients of control and provides little legal incentive for physicians to
advance the state of medicine by informing patients of treatment
alternatives.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief national survey of the two
schools of thought doctrine and traces the history of the doctrine in
Pennsylvania. Part III of this Comment critiques the Chidester decision,
noting the vagueness of the quantitative standard and how the standard
may inhibit medical innovation and a patient's right to medical selfdetermination. Part IV compares Pennsylvania's informed consent
doctrine with the same doctrine in other jurisdictions and suggests that
updating Pennsylvania's informed consent doctrine would remedy the
problems created by Chidester. Part V concludes that Pennsylvania
should integrate the two schools of thought doctrine and the informed
consent doctrine in order to protect patient rights and spur medical
innovation.
II. History of the Two Schools of Thought Doctrine
A. A National Survey of the Doctrine
Courts have long recognized that medicine is not an exact science"
and that therefore physicians are bound to disagree over the propriety
of various treatments. The courts further recognize that lay juries are
not qualified to umpire such disagreements among learned medical

7. See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Rice v. Tissaw, 112 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. 1941); Opp v. Pryor, 128 N.E. 580, 583
(il1. 1920); Gielskie v. State of New York, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).

Two SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT DOCTRINE

professionals.'
Several patterns emerge, however, in the judicial
treatment of dissension among medical experts.
Most jurisdictions instruct that physicians are required to use their
best judgment, but are not liable for errors in judgment in choosing one
accepted treatment over another.' °
These courts may explicitly
provide that the physician's error in judgment must not deviate from the
professional standard of care." Some jurisdictions instruct that an
honest error in judgment does not signal medical malpractice. 2 There
is a growing trend, however, to reject honest error language as unduly
exculpatory and to instruct with less argumentative and misleading
language.3
A minority of jurisdictions follows the two schools of thought
doctrine, holding that when opposing parties to a medical malpractice
action present evidence of conflicting schools of thought regarding the
acceptability of a particular treatment, a jury is not permitted to
determine which treatment should have been provided to the
plaintiff. 4 The "two schools" jurisdictions define a second school of
thought in one of two ways. Most define a second school of thought
as one followed by a reputable or respected body of physicians in good
standing within their medical community.' 5 In contrast, other states,

9.
10.

E.g., Remley, 79 Pa. Super. at 123.
1 STEvEN E. PEGALIS, J.D. & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, M.D., J.D., AMERICAN LAW OF

MEDICAL MALPRACnCE § 2.9 at 69 (1980).. See also Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 246
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a physician is not negligent when exercising "best judgment"
in selecting one of several approved treatment modes); Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577 (N.J.
1964) (holding that doctor is not liable for error in judgment if decision does not represent a
departure from the standard of care); Spadaccini v. Dolan, 407 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978) (upholding use of error in judgment charge where alternative treatment methods exist).
11. E.g., Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986); Schueler v.
Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577 (N.J. 1964); Wall v. Stout, 311 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. 1984).
12. E.g., Miller v. Kennedy, 588 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1978).
13. See, e.g., Sleavin v. Greenwich Gynecology & Obstetrics, P.C., 505 A.2d 436 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1986); Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986); Rodgers v.
Meridian Park Hosp., 772 P.2d 929 (Or. 1989). In Rodgers, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that
the term "honest error" is contradictory when applied to the use of acceptable alternative
treatments, since the use of any "acceptable" alternative could not be erroneous.
14. E.g., Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., 727 P.2d 355 (Ariz. CL App. 1986); Schwab v.
Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992).
15. Borja v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., 727 P.2d 355, 357-58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Baldor v.
Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1955) (reversing lower court judgment for plaintiff because
treatment provided by defendant-physician was accepted by "respectable minority" of physicians);
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654, 668 (Utah 1937) (stating that a physician is not negligent if
treatment employed is approved by "respectable portion" of the profession). See also Schwab v.
Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). In Schwab, the court held that the
principles inherent in defendant's requested "respectable minority" instruction were adequately
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including Pennsylvania, hold that a second school of thought is
comprised of a "considerable number" of medical professionals who
advocate the disputed medical treatment.' 6
Finally, a few jurisdictions openly reject the use of both the error
in judgment and the two schools of thought instructions; these courts
instruct on simple negligence. 7 In Hood v. Phillips,'" the Texas
Supreme Court held that a physician is not liable for malpractice if he
employs a treatment that reasonable and prudent members of the
profession would use in the same or similar circumstances. "9 In
contrast to the affirmative defenses provided by the error in judgment
and the two schools of thought doctrines, the negligence standard
approved by the Hood court burdens the plaintiff with proving as part
of her prima facie case that the physician failed to choose a treatment
which other reasonable and prudent doctors would have employed.
B. The "Two Schools" Doctrine in Pennsylvania
Historically, Pennsylvania's definition of a second school of
thought has itself been the subject of divided opinion. The controversy
began when the superior court failed to set forth the doctrine clearly in
Remley v. Plummer,2" the first Pennsylvania case to discuss the two
schools of thought issue. The court's discussion of the two schools
doctrine recognized the relevancy of both the reputation and number of
physicians following the disputed school of thought." On one hand,
the court stated that a physician is not liable for malpractice "if in the
exercise of his judgment he followed the course of treatment advocated
by a considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing
in his community."2
On the other hand, the court stated that
"practitioners of a reputable school of medicine are not to be harassed
by litigation and mulcted in damages because the course of treatment

covered in trial court's instruction that a physician fulfills standard of care when he uses a method
approved by "reasonably skilled" members of his profession. For Pennsylvania cases applying this
qualitative standard, see text accompanying note 29.
16. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992) (holding a physician not liable for
following a course of therapy supported by a "considerable number of recognized and respected
professionals"); Truan v. Smith 578 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. 1979) (noting that a physician is not
negligent for providing treatment which was advocated by a "considerable number of physicians
of good standing").
17. E.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 165.
20. 79 Pa. Super. 117 (1922).
21. Id. at 122-24.
22. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).

Two SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT DOCTRINE

prescribed by that school differs from that adopted by another
school."2 3 The court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff because
"[t]he testimony clearly showed a difference of medical opinion,
expressed by physicians and surgeons of unquestioned standing and
reputation, and the defendants were not negligent for having adopted the
view held by the majority of their brethren who testified."24
In Duckworth v. Bennett,25 decided in 1935, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court followed the quantitative standard set forth in Remley.
The Duckworth court held that when competent medical authority is
divided, a physician will not be held liable "if, in the exercise of his
judgment, he followed a course of treatment advocated by a
considerable number of his professional brethren in good standing in his
community."26 Although the quantitative standard is prominent in the
decision, a qualitative standard seems implicit in the court's holding as
well.2"
Thirty years later, in Tobash v. Jones,2 8 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court completely abandoned the "considerable number" language of
Duckworth, quoting only the qualitative standard set forth in Remley.29
Moreover, the court upheld a "two schools" instruction which defined
a second school of thought as one supported by "reputable, respectable
and reasonable medical experts."30 Consequently, the lower courts
adopted the qualitative "reputable and respected" standard to determine
the existence of a second school of thought,3 despite a later supreme

23. Id.at 123 (emphasis added).
24. Id. The court added that if the defendant committed any error, it was an error of
judgment common to a "large proportion" of his colleagues. Remley, 79 Pa. Super. at 123-24.
25. 181 A. 558 (Pa. 1935).
26. Id. at 559.
27. The court noted that four surgeons "of established reputation and wide experience"
supported the defendant physician's course of treatment. Id.at 558. The obscurity of the patient's
symptoms and the resulting difficulty in providing an accurate diagnosis served to further persuade
the court of its convictions. Id.at 559. Later, however, upon finding no explicit use of the words
"reputable" or "respected," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d
964, 968, 969 (Pa. 1992), that the Duckworth standard was strictly quantitative.
28. 213 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1965).
29. Id.at 593.
30. Id. The trial court instructed the jury in the following manner:
Now if you find that under that evidence .. .there is competent authority, although
divided ... subscribed to by reputable, respectable and reasonable medical experts, and
if you find that Dr. Jones followed one of those lines in performing this [procedure]...
then you couldn't say he was negligent for following any of the recognized experts in
the field.
Id.at 592.
31. Sinclair by Sinclair v. Block, 594 A.2d 750, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Levine v. Rosen,
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32
which returned to the
court case, Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital,
"considerable number" standard.
Although Brannan quoted the
quantitative "considerable number" standard found in Duckworth," the
court also recognized as a "longstanding rule" that a jury may not find
a physician liable if his treatment choice is supported by "respectable
'
authority."34
Regardless, the court held that a treatment advocated by
a "small respected body" of medical practitioners was insufficient to
trigger a two schools instruction."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was recently called upon in
Jones v. Chidester36 to settle the confusion created by the use of both
quantitative and qualitative language in judicial explanations of the two
schools of thought doctrine. In Chidester, the defendant used a
tourniquet to create a bloodless surgical field during an operation on the
plaintiff's leg." The plaintiff alleged that this procedure caused nerve
damage to his leg, and he offered expert medical testimony at trial in
support of that claim." The defendant, however, proffered expert
testimony which supported the use of a tourniquet during the
operation.3 9 The trial court instructed the jury that "a physician . . .
will not be held liable to a plaintiff merely for exercising his judgment
in applying the course of treatment supported by a reputable and
respected body of medical experts, even if another body of medical
experts' opinion would favor a different course of treatment. '4 0 The

575 A.2d 579, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Morganstein v. House, 547 A.2d 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); Trent v. Trotman, 508 A.2d 580, 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Furey v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 472 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). But see D'Angelis v. Zakuto, 556 A.2d
431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that instruction on the two schools doctrine was incorrect when
language of instruction could mislead jury into believing that any expert testimony in support of
defendant's treatment is sufficient to constitute a second school of thought).
32. 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 1980).
33. Id. at 200.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 201. The plaintiff's expert medical witness testified that while a "small respected
body" of physicians would have treated the patient as the defendant did, the "great majority" of
practitioners would have treated the patient differently. Brannan,417 A.2d at 201. The court held
that because such a minority was "a far cry from treatment approved by a considerable number
of physicians," the expert's testimony did not require instruction on the "two schools of thought"
doctrine. Id.
36. 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992).
37. Id. at 965.
38. Id. at 966.
39. Id.
40. Id. Although the trial court instructed the jury as to the "reputable and respected"
standard, it referred to both the qualitative and quantitative standards in its disposition of post-trial
motions, holding that the doctrine applied only to a school of thought supported by a considerable
number of reputable and respected physicians. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 966.

TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT DOCTRINE

jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed the court's use
of the "reputable and respected" standard in its instruction on the two
schools of thought doctrine. 4'
After discussing the history of the doctrine in both Pennsylvania
and other jurisdictions, the supreme court found that the Remley,
Duckworth, and Brannan courts appropriately used both qualitative and
quantitative language in their decisions.42 The court also found that
the use of both standards in Remley created "a blurring of distinctions"
between the two tests. 43 The court noted, however, that its 1980
decision in Brannan" apparently distinguished between the qualitative
and quantitative standards and required a second school of thought to
be followed by a "considerable number" of physicians. 45
The court finally settled on the use of both standards, requiring that
a second school of thought be supported by reputable and respected
physicians to insure quality and by a considerable number of physicians
to meet general, although not necessarily majority, acceptance.46 Thus,
the court concluded that when "competent medical authority is divided,
a physician will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his
judgment he followed a course of treatment advocated by a considerable
number of recognized and respected professionals in his given area of
expertise."'7
Pennsylvania's two schools of thought doctrine stands in stark
contrast to the error in judgment instruction provided by the vast
majority of jurisdictions."' The purpose of both doctrines is to allow
physicians sufficient discretion to practice an inexact science and to
encourage medical innovation. 49 Although both doctrines recognize

41.
42.

Id.
Id.at 969.

43. Id.
44. 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 1980). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Brannan.
45. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969.
46. Id.
47. Id. According to Chidester, the existence of two schools of medical thought is to be
established by the defendant-physician's expert testimony, although the issue ultimately remains
a question of fact for jury determination. Id.However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Zappala
stated that the existence of two schools of thought should always be a question of law for the trial
judge. Id.at 970.
48. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text
49. The following passage from Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa. Super. 117 (1922), hints of this
purpose:
Wide publicity was given in the newspapers and magazines recently to the fact that an
eminent physician and surgeon at a meeting of the American Medical Association
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the dangers of unfettered discretion,5" each limits the exercise of
medical judgment through different means.
"Error in judgment"
jurisdictions instruct that a physician's exercise of medical discretion is
limited by the applicable standard of care. 5' In contrast, Pennsylvania
instructs that a physician's exercise of judgment is negligent when it
departs from the practice of a "considerable number" of physicians.52
The next section will explore the ramifications of Pennsylvania's two
schools of thought doctrine.
III. A Critique of the Chidester Decision
Concerned that a physician may escape liability after producing
merely one or two sympathetic expert witnesses," the Chidester court
intended to promulgate a rule of law which would encourage quality
medical care.54
The wisdom of its decision, however, remains
questionable for several reasons. First, Chidester improperly defines the
standard of medical care in quantitative terms. Second, the quantitative
standard set forth by the court is inherently vague and is unlikely to be
applied in a consistent fashion. Third, the Chidester ruling may inhibit
medical innovation. Finally, the decision diminishes a patient's freedom
to choose the medical treatment to be received.

doubted the efficacy and advisability of the use of radium in the treatment of cancer.
Other physicians and surgeons of equal prominence differed from him. Surely a
reputable physician should not be subjected to the risk of loss of his professional
standing and the payment of damages because in the exercise of his best judgment he
agreed with one or the other of the noted disputants on this important but mooted
question.
Id. at 123. See also Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977) (supporting physician
experimentation and exercise of professional judgment in order to provide greater medical benefits
for society).
50. In Wall v. Stoudt, 311 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. 1984), ,the court held that the honest error in
judgment instruction was misleading and unduly exculpatory. Id. at 577. To prevent jurors from
erroneously believing that any exercise of discretion is not actionable, the court held that the "error
in judgment" instruction must be given in the context of an instruction on the standard of
reasonable care. Id. Similarly, by placing a quantitative or qualitative standard in the "two
schools" instruction, courts implicitly recognize that there should be limits to the exercise of
medical discretion. See Brannan v. Lankenau Hasp., 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 1980) (holding that a
"small respected body" of physicians who supported the defendant's treatment was insufficient to
trigger the "two schools" instruction).
51. E.g., Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Ouellette by
Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986); Wall v. Stout, 311 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. 1984);
Watson v. Hockett, 727 P.2d 669 (Wash. 1986).
52. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992).
53. See id. at 970 (McDermott, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 969. The court stated that a school of thought should be supported by "reputable
and respected physicians" to insure quality medical care and by a "considerable number" of
physicians "for the purpose of meeting general acceptance." Id.

TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT DOCTRINE

A. Redefining the Standard of Care
Physicians are required to exercise the knowledge, skill and care
ordinarily employed by other doctors who are in good professional
standing." However, under Pennsylvania's two schools of thought
doctrine, a physician's alternative treatment choice is consistent with the
standard of care only if it complies with the "considerable number"
test. 6
By directing jury inquiry to more than the issue of
reasonableness, the Chidester decision has effectively redefined the
standard of care in those medical malpractice cases that involve a
dispute over alternative treatment methods.
Both the "respectable minority" and "considerable number" tests
have been rejected in well reasoned and persuasive opinions precisely
because they redefine the standard of care." The California Court of
Appeals voiced its disapproval of the "respectable minority" standard
in Hubbard v. Calvin.58 In Hubbard, the trial court instructed the jury
to find the defendant physician liable if his treatment of the plaintiff
was not approved by a respectable minority of physicians.59 The court
held that the instruction was improper because it misstated the standard
of care.6" The court noted that the correct definition of a physician's
duty of care fails to refer to a quantitative standard. 6 Further, the
court objected to the instruction's inculpatory language.62 While some
jurisdictions instruct that a physician is not liable if he follows a
respectable minority of colleagues,63 the court refused to allow juries

55. KEETON, supra note 3, § 32 at 187.
56. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969.
57. Hubbard v. Calvin, 147 Cal. Rptr. 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Hood v. Phillips, 554
S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
58. 147 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). Presumably, this court would also oppose
the stricter "considerable number" standard.
59. Id. at 907. In Hubbard, the plaintiff was partially paralyzed after receiving a cerebral
angiogram that was performed by a neurosurgeon. Id. at 906-907. The trial court instructed the

jury:
If you find that the technique used by the defendant . . . was not approved by a
respectable minority of neurosurgeons .. . , you are instructed to find that the defendant
...violated his duty to use the care and skill ordinarily exercised in like cases by
reputable neurosurgeons practicing under similar circumstances.
Id. at 907.
60. Id.
61. Hubbard v. Calvin, 147 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
62. Id. at 908.
63. See Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1954); Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291,
294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). Both cases were cited in Hubbard, although the Hood decision was
later appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. For a discussion of the later Hood decision, see infra
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to be instructed in absolute terms that a physician is liable if he does
not follow his colleagues."
Similarly, in Hood v. Phillips," the Texas Supreme Court found
that the use of either a "respectable minority" or "considerable number"
test would encourage the use of an improper standard of care." The
Hood court recognized that a physician's freedom to exercise medical
judgment encourages innovation.6 7 Thus, the court rejected a standard
which would hold a physician liable for any variance from the accepted
method of treatment. 68
It rejected the respectable minority and
considerable number tests, believing that those tests could cause a jury
to determine the standard of care based on a poll of the medical
profession. 69 Finally, the court promulgated a negligence standard,
holding that a physician is not liable for selecting a mode of treatment
that a reasonable and 70prudent physician would employ in the same or
similar circumstances.
As Hubbard and Hood recognize, the medical standard of care is
not conditioned on a quantitative test.
The primary issue is
reasonableness, not merely whether the physician acted as a
"considerable number" of physicians would have responded in similar
circumstances.
Although the number of physicians espousing a
particular therapy may be probative of the reasonableness of a
defendant's action, a jury should not focus solely on a quantitative test.
Juries should consider the state of medical knowledge, the health of the
patient, the resources available to the physician, and other relevant
factors.
B. Defining "Considerable Number"
Exactly, or even approximately, how many physicians constitute a
"considerable number" for purposes of the two schools doctrine is

notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
64. Hubbard, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
65. 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
66. Id. at 165.
67. Id. The court stated: "[Pihysicians should be allowed to exercise their professional
judgment in selecting a mode or form of treatment. . . . [They] should be allowed to experiment
in order that medical science can provide greater benefits for humankind." Id.
68. id.
69. Hood, 554 S.W.2d at 165.
70. Id. The court added that such circumstances may include the state of medical knowledge,
the patient's health, the expertise of the physician and the means available to the physician. Id.
Further, the court stated that the standard it set forth should be applied regardless of whether the
treatment was experimental, outmoded, or rejected. Id

Two SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT DOCTRINE

unknown. By definition the term defies numerical certainty,7 and the
Chidester court specifically declined to state an exact numerical
threshold which would trigger the doctrine's application."2 While
Chidester does not require that a physician's treatment choice enjoy
majority support,73 the decision may require defendants, who bear the
burden of proof on the issue,74 to numerically estimate their
support. 75
While the "considerable number" standard is ambiguous,
Pennsylvania courts are not completely without guidance regarding what
may satisfy the test. In Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital,76 a "small
respected body" of practitioners did not constitute a "considerable
number" when opposed by "the great majority" who advocated a
different treatment.7 7 On the other hand, a "considerable number"
need not require a majority consensus, although it must quantify
"general acceptance" of the disputed treatment.78
Such a standard can be easily manipulated by a jury. Where
defendants present an especially sympathetic case, the support of ten
percent of their colleagues may be sufficiently "considerable" to warrant
a defense verdict. Conversely, a jury may find for a sympathetic
plaintiff after determining that the support of forty percent of the
defendant's peers does not satisfy the standard. Thus, not only may
physicians need to numerically estimate their support, but they may
never be able to predict with any accuracy what quantity of support will
satisfy a jury. 9

71. The word "considerable" has been defined as "more than a little; moderately large,"
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 389 (Jean L. McKechnie, ed., 2d ed.
1983), and "somewhat, rather, or pretty large in amount." OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 858
(JAMES A.H. MuRRAY, et al. eds., 1970).
72. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Melissa Kelly, State Supreme Court Tightens Reins on MalpracticeDefense, PA. L.J. July
6, 1992, at 1, 15.
76. 417 A.2d 196 (Pa. 1980).
77. Id. at 201.
78. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969.
79. Juries often react emotionally to trial testimony, the parties involved and a myriad of
other factors. Randall R. Bovbjerg, et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpracticeand Other Personal
Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 37 (1991). Such emotional reactions
result in disparate awards for factually similar cases. Id One result of disparate awards is that
settlement and negotiation prospects may suffer. See Frank A. Sloan and Stephen S. van Wert,
Cost andCompensation of Injuries in Medical Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 132
n.7 (1991).
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C. Inhibiting Innovation
In addition to altering the standard of care, the Chidester court
failed to recognize that some quality therapeutic modalities, especially
when new or expensive, may not enjoy immediate general acceptance
even though they may be supported by reputable and respected
physicians. For example, the Mayo Clinic currently recommends
surgical orchiectomy over chemical orchiectomy,80 contrary to virtually
the remainder of the medical profession." Although well respected,
the Mayo Clinic physicians would not likely constitute a "considerable
number." Thus, the dramatic rift in professional opinion regarding
orchiectomy may not, under Chidester, trigger the two schools of
thought doctrine.
By allowing medical malpractice liability to hinge on a quantitative
standard of care, Chidester may inhibit medical innovation. Although
a treatment may no longer be considered experimental, 82 it may enjoy
the support of only a respectable minority during the infancy of its
popularity. Nevertheless, those espousing such a viewpoint should not
necessarily have to risk liability merely because they do not constitute
a "considerable number." One cannot expect every innovative idea to
gain the support of a "considerable number" of physicians overnight.
In fact, it is the experience of a "respectable minority" which becomes
the foundation for eventual approval by a "considerable number." The
danger of the Chidester standard is that even the bravest physicians may
decline using respected innovative procedures in fear of the significant
liability risk created by Chidester.
Moreover, the quantitative standard pronounced in Chidester comes
perilously close to holding physicians liable for any variance from
accepted medical care. According to Chidester, physicians risk liability
when they perform an alternative treatment that is not generally
accepted by the profession, regardless of whether their actions are

80. An orchiectomy is the removal of one or both of the testes. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1096 (William R. Hensyl, ed., 25th ed. 1990). A chemical orchiectomy requires the
use of prescription drugs to inhibit the production of hormones, thus achieving the same result as
a surgical orchiectomy without physical removal of the testes. Interview with Blake L. Powell,
M.D., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law, in Carlisle, Pa. (Nov. 11,
1992). Both surgical and chemical orchiectomies are treatments for advanced prostate cancer. Id.
81. Interview with Blake L. Powell, M.D., J.D., supra note 80.
82. Investigatory or experimental treatments do not fall under the purview of the "two
schools of thought" or "error in judgment" doctrines. Physicians who perform such treatments are
required to obtain their patients' informed consent before initiating therapy, and failure to do so
will result in liability. FAY A. ROzOVSKY, J.D., M.P.H., CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE §§ 8.0-8.30 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ROzOVSKY].
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reasonable.8 3 Such a standard incorrectly implies that all patients can
be treated similarly. In announcing the criteria by which a second
school of thought is defined, Chidester did not acknowledge the infinite
variety of circumstances that may decrease the value of a popular
treatment and increase the attractiveness of more innovative
therapies. 4 Such conditions may include not only the patient's age
and concomitant diseases, but also the variety of drugs a patient may
take, the side effect profiles of each drug, the psychological condition
of the patient, the patient's lifestyle, and a myriad of other factors.85
D.

Diminishing Patients' Freedom of Choice

Chidester may also decrease the ability of patients to control their
health care destinies. Unlike most jurisdictions, Pennsylvania does not
impose on physicians any legal duty to inform patients of the risks and
alternatives to noninvasive treatments such as drug therapy. 6 While
physicians may have provided such information anyway, Chidester now
supplies a legal incentive to keep patients uninformed because a
patient's knowledge of risks and alternatives may cause her to choose
a different treatment that could lead to liability under Chidester's
quantitative standard. With no legal duty to obtain informed consent,
a physician wishing to avoid liability under Chidester may simply
decide not to fully inform the patient about a particular treatment.
Without knowledge of risks and alternative treatments, patients have no
choice but to accept therapies approved by a "considerable number" of
physicians. Thus, Chidester deprives patients of control and provides
no legal incentive for physicians to advance the state of medicine by
informing patients of treatment alternatives.
In light of the majority of jurisdictions that do not apply the
"considerable number" standard, 7 Pennsylvania has joined a less than
respectable minority of jurisdictions. The ideal of innovative, quality
health care is better served by the error in judgment standard followed

83. Chidester, 610 A.2d at 969.
84. See id.
85. Indeed, "[w]hen the infinite genetic variability of patients is factored into the equation,
it becomes clear that the results in patients properly managed with the same treatment can vary
significantly, despite the efforts of competent and highly motivated practitioners." Kim R.
Kleppel, Note, Dual Capacity Liability and Co-Employee Company Physicians: Undermining the
Integrity of the Workers' Compensation System, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1447, 1457-58 n.58 (1991).
86. See, e.g., Wu v. Spence, 605 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
87. See supra notes 10, 12.
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by so many other jurisdictions."8 Where alternative treatments are in
dispute, a standard which allows a physician discretion in choosing
among therapeutic options will not adversely affect patient care,
provided that the same instruction requires consideration of the
requisites of ordinary care. 9 Thus, the error in judgment standard is
preferable because it does not make liability contingent on a quantitative
standard, and it allows a jury to consider the reasonableness of a
treatment that is advocated by a reasonable minority of physicians.
The Chidester decision is too recent, however, to provide any
realistic hope for reversal or reconsideration in the near future.
Therefore, the remainder of this Comment will be devoted to
introducing a solution to the problems created by Chidester.
IV. The Use of Informed Consent to Remedy the Chidester Problem
As discussed above, the Chidester decision inhibits a physician's
freedom to employ innovative medical treatments and restricts a
patient's ability to choose and benefit from those treatments. 90 For
example, if a physician believes that a new drug therapy will be better
for a patient, but the treatment is not yet accepted by a "considerable
number" of physicians, the physician risks liability under the two
schools of thought doctrine and the patient may never receive that
treatment. With the increasing number of potent new drugs available
for the treatment of disease, this outcome is especially disappointing.
Innovation would be less inhibited if a physician could escape the
threat of liability by obtaining a patient's informed consent to any
therapy which is not yet approved by a "considerable number" of
physicians. To accommodate a defense of informed consent when the
two schools of thought doctrine applies, Pennsylvania would have to
recognize a physician's duty to disclose information regarding any
noninvasive procedures to be performed. 9' Such an integration of the
"two schools" and informed consent doctrines would enable physicians
to advance medicine through the use of innovative therapies without
risking liability. Moreover, patients would gain control of important
health care decisions and benefit from the resulting progress in

88. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
89. See Teh Len Chu v. Fairfax Emergency Medical Assoc., Ltd., 290 S.E.2d 820, 822 (Va.
1982).
90. See supra part III.C.
91. Currently, Pennsylvania does not recognize informed consent actions for noninvasive
procedures such as drug therapy. Wu v. Spence, 605 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Because
many innovative medical therapies are noninvasive, Pennsylvania would be remiss if informed
consent were recognized as a defense only to operative procedures.
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medicine. Before further analyzing the use of an informed consent
defense, this Comment will discuss the principles and history of the
doctrine and survey the related law in Pennsylvania.
A. History of the Informed Consent Doctrine
The doctrine of informed consent"' is founded upon the principle
that all patients have the right to determine what shall be done to their
own bodies.93 Historically, a physician's failure to obtain patient
approval for an operative procedure was recognized as a battery.9 4 In
an action for medical battery, the patient must prove that (1) the
physician performed a procedure or treatment beyond the scope of the
patient's consent; (2) the treatment provided was substantially different
from that to which the patient agreed; and (3) the physician
intentionally deviated from the care to which the patient agreed.95
For several reasons, the battery theory of liability is viewed as an
inadequate legal response to the violation of a patient's right to medical
self-determination.96
First, courts have recognized that physicians
rarely intend to injure their patients.9 7 Second, the battery theory
exposes physicians to liability regardless of whether the patient was
physically injured as a result of the procedure performed.9" Finally,

92. The following discussion of the informed consent doctrine is merely a brief summary of
the law. For a more comprehensive treatment of the doctrine, see ROZOVSKY, supra note 82; PAUL
S. APPELBAUM, M.D. Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE
(1987); Michael J. Myers, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1396
(1967); Marcus L. Plante, Comment, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORD. L. REVIEW
639 (1968).
93. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.).
In a frequently quoted passage from Schloendorff, Judge Cardozo stated: "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has the right to determine what should be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable for damages." Id. See also Hondroulis v. Schumacher, 546 So. 2d 466, 473
(La. 1989) (holding that a patient's right to make an informed therapy choice is inherent in a
constitutional right to privacy).
94. See e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905); Schloendorff v. Society of New
York losp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
95. RozoVSKY, supra note 82, at § 1.2. If an emergency prevents a physician from obtaining
consent from the patient or his family, the physician may offer this circumstance as a defense.
E.g., Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A. 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
96. See generally, Richard E. Shugrue & Kathryn Linstromberg, The Practitioner's Guide
to Informed Consent, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 881 (1991); ROzOVSKY, supra note 82, at § 1.3.
97. E.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.1. 1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973).
98. RozOVSKY, supra note 82, at § 1.2. Indeed, a patient may recover under a battery theory
even if the nonconsensual treatment was beneficial. E.g., Bailey v. Belinfante, 218 S.E.2d 289
(Ga. Ct. App 1975).
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courts have recognized the injustice of a liability theory which prevents
recovery when a patient has consented to an operation after receiving
insufficient information with which to make an intelligent consent. 99
Consequently, although a consent action in battery may be appropriate
where there is a nonconsensual treatment, 00 such actions are
recognized by only a minority of jurisdictions.o'
The concept of "informed" consent was born in response to the
deficiencies of the battery standard. The first case which recognized
informed consent was Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of
Trustees,'0 2 in which the California Court of Appeals stated:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the known
dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's
03
consent.1
Salgo included the rather cryptic holding that a physician may withhold
disturbing information from the patient provided that such was
"consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent."' 4 This is known as the defense of therapeutic
privilege. 0
0 6 the Kansas
In Natanson v. Kline,"
Supreme Court elaborated on
the Salgo court's brief discussion of disclosure. Natanson promulgated
a professional standard of disclosure, holding that a physician must only
disclose information that a reasonable medical practitioner would
disclose under similar circumstances.
The information to be
99. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
100. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
101. E.g., Spikes v. Heath, 332 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Wu v. Spence, 605 A.2d 395
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Pugsley v. Privette, 263 S.E.2d 69 (Va. 1980). In Arizona, however, state
legislation which abolished consent actions in battery was held unconstitutional under the state
constitution. Rubino v. Fretias, 638 F. Supp. 182 (D. Ariz. 1986).
102. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
103. Id.at 181.
104. Id.
105. Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward
a New Self-fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379, 391 (1990) [hereinafter MEDICAL
DECISIONMAKING].

106. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), affid on reh'g, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960). In Nalanson, the
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit to recover for injuries sustained as a result of excessive
radiation treatment. Id.at 1095. The trial court instructed that the physician had a fiduciary duty
to disclose fully "all matters within his knowledge affecting the interests of the patient." Id.at
1099.
107. Id.at 1106. The court stated:
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disclosed included the nature of the illness and the probable
consequences and inherent risks of the proposed treatment.""
In Canterbury v. Spence,'" the District of Columbia Circuit
Court recognized the inadequacy of a professional standard of
disclosure." ° The court reasoned that "[riespect for the patient's right
of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by
law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not
impose upon themselves.""' Canterbury held that physicians have
a duty to disclose all information that a reasonable patient would
consider material to a decision to undergo the recommended
treatment."112 The court stated that the information to be disclosed
must be measured by the patient's need for information'.. and should
include the risks of therapy, the alternatives to the proposed treatment,
and the consequences of receiving no treatment.'
Canterbury defined the elements of an informed consent action
grounded in negligence. ' 5 The court held that in addition to proving
that the physician breached a duty to disclose certain information, the
patient must prove that the failure to disclose caused injury." 6 Such
a causal relationship exists only when the reasonable patient would have
refused the treatment upon disclosure of material information.",
Although the principle of patient autonomy is the foundation of
consent actions in both battery and negligence,"' the negligence
action as defined by Natanson and Canterbury better protects a patient's
right to receive information material to a treatment decision.
Accordingly, the great majority of jurisdictions recognize negligence as

So long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physician's
choice of plausible courses should not be called into question if it appears, all
circumstances considered, that the physician was motivated only by the patient's best
therapeutic interests and he proceeded as competent medical men would have done in
a similar situation.
Id.
108. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
109. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
110. Id.
11. Id.at 784.
112. Id.at 787.
113. Id.at 786.
114. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787-88.
115. Id.at787-791.
116. Id.at 790.
117. Id.at 791.
118. See supra note 94 (informed consent action in battery) and text accompanying notes 115117 (informed consent action in negligence).
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the proper basis for an informed consent action. 9 The protection
provided by such an action is limited, however, by the plaintiff's greater
burden of proof, 2 ' an exposure to more defenses,' 2' and the
possible applicability of a professional standard of disclosure.' 22
B. A History of the Informed Consent Doctrine in Pennsylvania
From its inception, the informed consent doctrine in Pennsylvania
has valued a patient's autonomy in health care decisionmaking. Sixty
years ago, Pennsylvania recognized physician liability for "technical
assault" when the consent of a mentally competent patient is not
obtained for an operation
performed
in nonemergency
circumstances.' 23 Thirty years later, in Gray v. Grunnagle,'24 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the consent given must be
"knowledgeable and informed,"' 25 the result of a true understanding
of the nature of the procedure to be performed. 126 In 1970, the Third
Circuit interpreted Gray to require the disclosure of not only the risks
of a recommended procedure, but the existence of available alternative
therapies as well.' 27 According to the court in Dunham v. Wright,
119. E.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I (Cal.
1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), affd on reh'g, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960);
Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 116-117.
121. These defenses include emergency, therapeutic privilege, the patient's previous knowledge
of the undisclosed information, and immateriality of the undisclosed facts. See Canterbury,464
F.2d at 788-89.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 107-110. The professional standard of disclosure is
followed in a majority of jurisdictions. E.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975).
123. Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A. 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932). In Moscicki, the plaintiff consented
to the eventual removal of all of her teeth, but insisted that half of the extractions be performed
at a later date. Id.at 341. While the patient was anesthetized, the physician removed all twentythree of her teeth. Id. The plaintiff further alleged that the extractions were negligently
performed, and thus asserted two potential grounds for recovery. Id.at 342.
124. 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966). Gray involved a plaintiff who sought treatment for muscular
atrophy in his leg. Id.at 665. Upon admission to the hospital and before the defendant
neurosurgeon was consulted for treatment, the plaintiff signed the hospital's general consent to
operation agreement. Id. Several days later, the defendant neurosurgeon performed an
unsuccessful exploratory laminectomy on the patient, relying on the general consent form signed
by the patient earlier. Id.The plaintiff sued for malpractice, alleging that the doctor exceeded the
scope of the plaintiff's consent by performing major surgery when the plaintiff had understood that
only an exploratory procedure would be performed. Id.at 668.
125. Gray, 223 A.2d at 671.
126. Id.at 674.
127. Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 944 (3d Cir. 1970). Three justices in Gray dissented
and two concurred solely on the grounds that consent is a jury issue. In addition, the Gray opinion
is largely comprised of quotations from case law and Robert E. Powell's Consent to Operation,
21 Md. L.Rev. 189 (1961). It is therefore difficult to extract a definitive holding from the decision
other than that the issue of consent is a jury question. Nevertheless, the Dunham interpretation
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"[t]he logical inference from [Gray] may be that it is not the prerogative
of the physician to keep secret and screen out any of the possible
complications of surgery."' 2 8 The Dunham court noted that the
doctrine requires a fine balance between "the right of the patient to
choose the treatment he wishes to undergo and the freedom of the
and progressive medicine without fear
physician to practice responsible
' 29
litigation."'
of frequent
This patient-oriented approach was followed by the superior court
in Cooper v. Roberts, 30 a decision which set the standard for
disclosure in Pennsylvania. Although most jurisdictions at the time
imposed a duty to disclose only that information which a reasonable
medical practitioner would disclose,' 3 ' the superior court progressively
invoked a "reasonable patient" standard. 3 2 Thus, in Pennsylvania, a
physician must disclose all the facts, risks, and alternatives that a
reasonable person in the patient's situation would deem material in
making a decision to undergo the proposed treatment. 133
The materiality of information is a jury question to be determined
with the aid of expert medical testimony regarding the nature and
potential for harm to occur, 34 as well as the availability and
feasibility of alternative treatments. 135 In Festa v. Greenberg,'3 6 the
superior court reasoned that without expert testimony, the average lay
juror would be unable to determine the truth of a plaintiff's allegations

of Gray has never been questioned by the Pennsylvania courts.
128.

Dunham, 423 F.2d at 944-45.

129. Id. at 942.
130. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). The plaintiff in Cooper suffered a perforated
stomach after receiving a gastroscopic examination, a procedure that her physician claimed should
not have resulted in any complications. Id. at 648. The trial court instructed the jury that the
physician was obligated to disclose only that information which a reasonable medical practitioner
would disclose. Id. at 649. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant physician. Id. at 648.
131. E.g., Haggerty v. McCarthy, 181 N.E.2d 562 (Mass. 1962); Roberts v. Young, 119
N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
132. Cooper, 286 A.2d at 650-51.

133. Id. The court found that the standard of disclosure exercised by the medical community
was inequitable for two reasons: (1) the standard failed to consider the amount of knowledge a
particular patient may require to make an informed consent, and (2) the patient's expense and
suffering should not be subordinated to the self-imposed standards of a medical community whose

conspiracy of silence is notoriously difficult to overcome. Id at 650.
134. Sagala v. Tavares, 533 A.2d 165, 167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). The expert testimony may
not, however, relate to professional customs of disclosure. Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1971).
135. Festa v. Greenberg, 511 A.2d 1371, 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
136. Id.
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of a procedure's risks and the existence of alternative treatments. 137
To resolve an informed consent claim, it is not necessary for the jury
to determine whether a patient subjectively understood the information
that was disclosed.

38

Unlike the standard set forth in Canterbury,139 Pennsylvania does
not require a plaintiff to show that a physician's failure to disclose
information caused the patient to accept treatment. 140 Thus, a risk
may be considered material even if it would not have resulted in refusal
of treatment. In Sagala v. Tavares, 4 the court reasoned that the
purpose of Pennsylvania's informed consent action is to provide patients
with enough information to allow intelligent treatment choices,
"regardless of whether the patient chooses rationally."' Under a
battery standard, a patient need not act rationally in her treatment
decisions because a mere nonconsensual touching is sufficient to trigger
liability. 143

Despite the nationwide trend toward establishing a negligence
standard for informed consent actions, Pennsylvania courts have
stubbornly refused to forsake the battery standard. '44 Consequently,
a plaintiff is still required to show that a nonconsensual "touching"
occurred. Because an increasing number of illnesses are now treated
with drugs instead of surgery,' this requirement may be the most
difficult hurdle for a patient to overcome.
For instance, plaintiffs injured through treatment with
pharmaceuticals cannot recover for injuries resulting from a physician's
failure to disclose fully the risks and alternatives to treatment. In

137. Id.at 1377. The court noted that its decision was in accordance with the law of other
"reasonable patient" jurisdictions. Id.at 1377, 1378; see, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md.
1977); Smith v. Shannon, 666 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1983).

138. DeFulvio v. Hoist, 414 A.2d 1087, 1089-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). In fact, for the
purposes of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1301.103,
"informed consent" does not contemplate consideration of a patient's subjective understanding of
the material disclosed.
139. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See supra text
accompanying notes 109-117.
140. Sagala v. Tavares, 533 A.2d 165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).

141. Id. In Sagala, the plaintiff's husband died from a pulmonary embolism following foot
surgery. Id.at 166. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician failed to warn her husband
that the risk of pulmonary embolism was inherent in such surgery. Id.
142. Id. at 168 (emphasis in original).
143.

Sagala, 533 ,A.2d at 169.

144. E.g., Dible v. Vagley, 612 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Boyer v. Smith, 497 A.2d 646
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
145.

Interview with Blake L. Powell, M.D., J.D., supra note 80.
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Malloy v. Shanahan,14 6 an arthritic patient continued to illegally refill
a prescription for arthritis medication and suffered partial blindness as
a result of her extended use of the drug.'47 In a plurality opinion, the
superior court recognized that the informed consent doctrine had not
been extended to the use of therapeutic drugs, a situation "where any
change of condition can be diagnosed and controlled."' 4 8 The court
held that the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury was her abuse of
the drug and the indiscretion of the pharmacies who supplied her with
9
4

it. 1

In 1985, the superior court definitively held that the informed
consent doctrine was applicable only to surgical or operative
procedures. 5 ' Not only was the court reluctant to discard the battery
standard set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gray, but the
court was also unpersuaded that a negligence standard was even
needed.'' The court stated that "in light of the day-to-day realities
of providing professional medical care, traditional medical malpractice
actions, sounding in negligence, are an adequate legal medium for
compensating patients for the injurious consequences of therapeutic
drug treatment."'5 2 The court failed to recognize that according to the
two schools of thought doctrine, prescribing one drug over another may
not constitute negligence even when the result has harmed the patient.
In such a case, no adequate legal remedy is available to the patient who

146. 421 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
147. Id. at 804. In 1958, the plaintiff received from the defendant a nonrefillable prescription
for a three-month supply of Chloroquine. Id. The plaintiff managed to obtain a continuous supply
of the drug from two pharmacies for twelve years without the knowledge of the prescribing
physician. Id.
148. Id. The court grossly overestimates the safety profile of many drugs as well as the ease
with which physicians can (1) determine which of several medications is causing a particular side
effect, and (2) distinguish between medication side effects and disease symptoms.
The decision of the three-judge panel in Malloy was of dubious precedence for related cases.
Judge Watkins wrote the opinion of the court, and Judge Price concurred in the result only.
Noting the trend in other jurisdictions to abandon the battery standard for informed consent
actions, Judge Hoffman persuasively argued in dissent that Pennsylvania should adopt a negligence
standard for informed consent cases. Malloy, 421 A.2d at 805.
149. Id. The plaintiff visited the prescribing physician only once during the twelve year period
that she illegally refilled the prescription; the defendant was not given any opportunity to discover
and control the medication's side effects. Id.
150. Boyer v. Smith, 497 A.2d 646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
15 1. Id. at 649. But see Lynne Heckert, Comment, Informed Consent in Pennsylvania - The
Need for a Negligence Standard,28 VILL. L. REv. 149 (1982-83).
152. Boyer, 497 A.2d at 649. The practical difficulty of discerning what information deserves
disclosure may have been one of the "realities" to which the court was referring. For further
discussion of this issue, see MEDICAL DECISIONmA1NG, supra note 105, at 397-430.
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is led down one drug treatment path without knowledge of safer
alternatives.
In Wu v. Spence,' the same court recently refused to concede
that the administration of intravenous drug therapy amounts to a
"touching" for which a patient could recover under a battery
standard. 15 4 In Wu, the plaintiff was treated for an infection with the
intravenous administration of an antibiotic.' 55 After developing a
serious side effect as a result of the antibiotic treatment, the patient
brought an informed consent action against her physician for his failure
to disclose fully the risks of her therapy." 6 The court found that the
"touching" requirement was not satisfied because the drug, not the
method of its administration, caused the plaintiff's injury. 157 While
the court was somewhat sympathetic to the plaintiff's argument for the
adoption of a negligence standard in informed consent cases,' it
nevertheless determined that such a decision could only be made by the
1 59
supreme court.
The absurdity -- and indeed, danger -- of a battery standard in

informed consent cases becomes even more apparent with the superior
court's most recent opinion on the subject. In Dible v. Vagley,' 60 the
plaintiff brought an informed consent action against a physician who,
while treating the patient for skin cancer, failed to disclose that a viable
alternative to radiation therapy was available. 16' Holding that the
153. 605 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
154. Id. at 396.
155. Id. at 395.
156. Id.
157. Id.at 396. The plaintiff claimed that she was not informed of the potential for a serious
side effect; she did not allege a lack of informed consent regarding the method of administration.
Wu, 605 A.2d at 396.
158. The court suggested that "[i]t
may be time for the Supreme Court to reconsider its
decision in Gray." Id. at 397. Perhaps the court's sympathy was founded on the realization that,
contrary to its assertion in Boyer, the traditional medical malpractice action sounding in negligence
could not provide adequate legal recourse for this plaintiff, who did not or could not sue for
negligence. The court recognized the increased use of drug treatments and the risks of those
treatments, which a patient is likely to consider material to a treatment decision: "A patient's
decision to undergo drug therapy should be no less informed than a decision to undergo surgery.
The law should require that a physician provide his patient with all available information and
options." Wu, 605 A.2d at 397. The court also noted with support Judge Hoffman's dissent in
Malloy, 605 A.2d at 397.
159. Malloy, 605 A.2d at 397.
160. 612 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
161. Id.at 495. The plaintiff had developed a cancerous growth near his ear. Id.at 494.
Because total excision of the growth would involve the mutilation of most of his ear, he was
willing to submit to only partial removal of the growth. Id. at 494-95. Consequently, the
remainder of the cancer was treated with 51 radiation treatments. Id.at 495. Two years later,
another cancerous growth was found, but the defendant physician was unwilling to recommend
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plaintiff's request for binding instructions on informed consent were
properly denied at the trial level, the court found that radiation
treatments were not a "touching" for informed consent purposes.'6 2
In addition, the court ignored the long-standing precedent that a
physician is63obligated to inform a patient of the existence of alternative
treatments.
While Pennsylvania protects patients with some of the more
progressive notions of informed consent, such as the "reasonable
patient" standard of disclosure, these protections are not available to
patients who receive drug therapy or other noninvasive procedures.
Such a result is inconsistent with the primary purpose of the informed
consent doctrine: to allow patients greater autonomy in determining
what shall be done to their own bodies.
The next section proposes
a solution to the problems created by both the Chidester decision and
Pennsylvania's informed consent doctrine.
C. Integrating the Informed Consent and Two Schools of Thought
Doctrines
By adopting an informed consent action in negligence,
Pennsylvania could achieve two important goals. First, such an action
would allow patients to exercise greater autonomy over their own health
care destinies. Patients would finally have a legally recognized role in
determining which, if any, noninvasive treatments to receive. Under the
expanded informed consent doctrine, a physician would be obliged to
disclose the risks of procedures such as chemotherapy and radiation, as
well as information regarding prescription medications. 65 Of course,
the state could continue to allow consent actions in battery when a
physician has intentionally failed to comply with the scope of a
patient's consent.

further radiation. Dible, 612 A.2d at 495. Instead, the plaintiff was referred to another physician

for a treatment known as Moh's chemosurgery. Id. This technique nevertheless resulted in the
removal of most of the plaintiff's ear. Id.
162. Dible, 612 A.2d at 496.
163. Id. The court alternatively held that "in the unlikely event that the definition of
'touching' were to be strained sufficiently to include the radiation treatments, appellant
acknowledges having been informed of their possible negative side effects, and nevertheless having
permitted the treatment to occur." Id.
164. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
165. For a detailed analysis of the practical aspects of obtaining an informed consent,
including physicizjn reactions to the doctrine, see MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 105, at
397-430.
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Second, an informed consent action in negligence would mitigate
66
the negative impact on medical innovation created by Chidester.'
By requiring physicians to disclose the risks of a particular therapy as
well as alternative treatments, an expanded informed consent action
encourages patient-consumers to choose the most beneficial treatments.
Because some of the most beneficial treatments are likely to be
innovative, medical science will be advanced for the benefit of future
patients.
An expanded informed consent doctrine could further encourage
innovation if considered as an exception to the quantitative standard of
the two schools of thought doctrine. By recognizing a legal duty to
disclose information regarding both invasive and noninvasive therapies,
Pennsylvania could accommodate such an informed consent exception.
Essentially, this exception would allow physicians to escape liability
when they perform treatments not yet accepted by a "considerable
number" of doctors, provided that they have obtained the patient's
informed consent to either invasive or noninvasive treatment. Thus,
physicians would be free to advance medical science
without being
67
"harassed by litigation and mulcted in damages."'
Although patients would benefit from the advancement of
medicine, they would not remain unprotected from an abuse of this
informed consent exception. If a physician failed to adequately disclose
information concerning the proposed treatment or its alternatives, the
patient could bring an informed consent action. Similarly, a patient
could still sue for medical malpractice if the physician negligently
performed the treatment.
V. Conclusion
By requiring physicians to perform only those treatments which are
supported by a "considerable number" of physicians, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has severely limited the value of the two schools of
thought doctrine. In addition to redefining the standard of care, the
quantitative "considerable number" standard may inhibit medical
innovation. The threat of liability under such a standard could decrease
a physician's incentive to advance the state of medicine.
The integration of the two schools of thought and informed consent
doctrines is a logical step toward support for medical innovation and
patient rights in Pennsylvania. An expanded informed consent action

166.
167.

See supra part III.C.
Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa. Super. 117, 123 (1922).
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based in negligence would give patients greater autonomy in health care
decisions involving noninvasive therapies. In addition, by integrating
an expanded informed consent doctrine with the two schools of thought
docrtine, physicians who obtain a patient's informed consent to
treatment may escape liability for performing a treatment not yet
accepted by a "considerable number" of physicians. The physician can
therefore continue to further the practice of medicine with innovative
therapies, and patients may continue to reap the benefits of state-of-theart medical care.
Joan P. Dailey

